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304 Rising influence of France.
Policy of Richelieu. HISTORY OF THE SWEDES.
Alliance between Sweden
and France renewed. [I ess-
truth constrains him to the confession, that tlie
Swedish chancellor had done all which it was
possible for a man of courage and sagacity to
do>.
The influence of France had risen in the same
proportion as that of Sweden had sunk, and in
Richelieu men had to do with the best calculator
of possibilities who perhaps was ever seen ^. It is
this extraordinary acuteness, combined with un-
shakeable stedfastness, which makes him so great.
"
Richelieu," says 0.xenstierna of his political rival
several years after his death,
" was a man remark-
able in counsel, a man not only of imderstanding,
but also of conduct and courage, whence also he
directed the work with such constancy in so long
time ;
as we else observe in the French, how soon
they determine for war, and just as soon again for
peace, and almost never heretofore pursue their
objects with earnestness and steadiness. Therein
also he was fortunate, adds the Swedish statesman,
that he died before the king, who defended his
actions ^." The independence of France, threatened
by Spanish and Austrian intrigues within its own
borders, had provoked Richelieu’s opposition against
the preponderance of the house of Hapsburg. From
defence he passed to attack, and already turned his
eyes on the Rhine as the future frontier of France.
The war in Germany and Holland, he said to his
king in 1633, must be maintained, cost what it viill,
but as long as po.ssible only by subsidy, without
France openly taking part in it; meanwhile we
must seek to obtain, as price of this support, the
strong places on the Rhine; if this should hereafter
lead to open war, the advantages would be great
and the danger trifling ;
the king might extend his
dominions to the Rhine only by accepting what had
been won by the ai-ms of others, and by its mere
possession in pledge might make himself arbiter
of war and peace ;
he would likewise have footing
thereby in Strasburg, Franche-Comtd, Luxemburg,
might curb Lorraine, and restrain the enemy from
meddling with the internal affairs of France; Swe-
den should not be allowed to fall, but its prepon-
derance in Germany must be averted ; perhaps
time might by some accident remove all danger in
this respect, just as it had already freed Christen-
• " The director did all that a man of courage and conduct
was capable of doing
"
Id. viii. 174.
* See the inbtructions (in many respects worthy of admi-
ration), of which his memoirs chiefly consist.
3 Oxenstierna in the council, 1050. Palmsk. MSS. t. 190.
• Mem. de Richelieu, vii. 271. 274.
5 The convention between Bernard of Weimar and Riche-
lieu, at first kept secret, was concluded at St. Germain en
Laye, Oct. 17, 1635.
5 The chancellor arrived the 20th April, 1635, at Com-
piegne, where his majesty was, who caused him to be received
and furnished with magnificence. He signed a new treaty
with the king, and left four days after to go to Paris, where
having sojourned until the 3d May, he went to Dieppe,
whence he passed into Holland, and thence into Low Saxony.
Mem. de Richelieu, viii. 344.
’ He had al.so, from distrust of the chancellor, made ad-
vances to the party in the government opposed to him,
though with little eflfect, because this formed the peace party.
King Lewis XIII. wrote himself to the high-marshal, Jacob
de la Gardie. The answer returned by the ministry, March
28, 1635, gives assurance of the marshal’s favourable dispo-
sition to the cause of Christendom and of France, the more
that he was himself of French extraction. In a separate
letter to Richelieu on the same day, he avers his wish to
dom from a great misfortune by the death of the
Swedish king*. The conjectured accident had now
occurred by the first overthrow of the Swedes in
Germany. A French army, which had already
made itself master of the prmcipal towns of Lor-
raine, was upon the Rhine to watch its opportunity.
The league of Heilbronn, whose most influential
members had previously been gained over by
French pension.s, now in despair threw themselves
absolutely into the arms of France. There were
no strong places on the Upper Rhine which they
were not willing to surrender, and Alsace besides
in pawn. Bernard of Weimar, now general of the
league, went himself with the remains of his army
into French pay ’’;
and in the secret articles which
accompanied the compact, the duke took assurance
from France of Alsace for himself, or compensation
in exchange at the peace. Last attempt of an
unfortunate ambition ! Bernard subsequently died
after the taking of Brisach, and France kept Al-
sace.
Oxenstierna also was compelled to seek Riche-
lieu. On his journey from Upper Germany, in the
spring of the year 1635, he took his way through
France,metthe cardinal in Compiegne, and adjusted
with him the conditions of a renewed alliance ^,
which was to be proposed to the Swedish govern-
ment. Their delay in the ratification was laid by
Richelieu to the chai’ge of Oxenstierna ’. For the
ministry refei-red the matter to the chancellor *,
and at last dismissed with this resolve the French
ambassador, who sought to win adherents in Stock-
holm, and sometimes held obnoxious language. The
chancellor, on the other hand, wished to gain time.
The peace of Prague had wrought a great change
in the state of circumstances. On the Swedish side
it was with reason objected that the purpose of the
alliance had ceased to exist, when the associates
for whose aid it was to be formed had disappeared.
Hesse-Cassel also took the advice of the chancellor
to seek a reconciliation with the emperor 3. At
home peace was determined upon, ultimately with
no other indemnity than payment of the demands
of the armies, and the cession of a town on the sea-
coast until the sum should be made good ;
and
even with these terms, Sweden had looked rather
contribute in every way to a good understanding between
the two kingdoms, and recommends one of his relatives in
France. Reg.
8 " We have further deliberated what answer we should give
Avaugour to his request of ratification, whereto he joins a
demand that we should maintain a certain number of troops
against the emperor. That would be to bind our hands ; to
refuse the ratification, on tlje other hand, would give oflence.
We will therefore keep the matter open some time, and
defer all this until further accounts from you, since things
meanwhile have much changed." The ministry to the
chancellor, Dec. 19, 1635. "We have already written to
you that we intended to detain the French envoy till we had
intelligence from you. Howbeit, since he after began to
make himself much too familiar (allt for mycket faniilier),
we have come to the resolution to dismiss him the sooner
the better, and refer him in all to you." The ministry to
the chancellor. Jan. 23, 1636.
9 " He had given this counsel to the landgrave." Mem.
de Richelieu, vii. 352. The landgrave’s widow afterwards
actually concluded the peace at Mentz, Aug. 11, 1638, but
the emperor did not ratify it, because he would not confirm
the required freedom of religion. PufTendorf, x. 445. So
far were the Austrians still removed from the first principle
of a religious peace.
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